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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this consolidated appeal following a jury trial, defendants challenge their 
convictions relating to a West Philadelphia drug trafficking operation.  Vaughn Nichols 
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 
846) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).  Nichols 
was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment, ten years of supervised release, a $2,500 
fine, and a $200 special assessment.  Lamont Williams was convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).  Williams was sentenced to 240 
months of imprisonment, ten years of supervised release, a $2,000 fine, and a $200 
special assessment.   
Nichols and Williams challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the 
jury‟s verdict that (1) they engaged in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and (2) the 
amount of cocaine they conspired to distribute equaled or exceeded five kilograms.  
Williams also challenges the denial of his motion to sever the charge of felon in 
possession of a firearm from the charge of conspiracy.  
 We will affirm.  
I 
Maurice Hudson was the target of a large-scale drug trafficking investigation in 
West Philadelphia that began in 2006.  Hudson ran his drug-distribution operation out of 
several properties he owned near Markoe and Ogden streets.  During the investigation, 
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this area was under extensive surveillance by law enforcement.  Officers installed pole 
cameras, wiretapped suspects‟ phones, and sent undercover agents to make controlled 
drug purchases.  The investigation culminated on November 20, 2008, when law 
enforcement executed search warrants for thirty-four residences and vehicles.  Williams‟ 
apartment was among those searched, and police recovered a handgun from the premises. 
Ultimately, Hudson and several other suspected members of the operation, 
including Nichols and Williams, were charged under a Second Superseding Indictment 
with conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846).  All 
defendants except Nichols and Williams entered guilty pleas.
1
  Pursuant to plea 
agreements, Hudson and co-defendant Michael Greene testified as cooperating witnesses 
at the trial of Williams and Nichols. 
Before trial, Williams made a motion to sever the felon-in-possession count and 
suppress evidence of the firearm from the conspiracy charge.  The court denied Williams‟ 
motion but bifurcated the trial so that evidence of Williams‟ prior convictions was not 
introduced until after the jury considered the conspiracy charge.   
The five-day trial began on October 25, 2010.  At trial, Hudson testified at length 
about his drug distribution operation and his dealings with Williams and Nichols in 2007 
and 2008.  Greene, who was present for many of Hudson‟s transactions, also testified as 
to defendants‟ drug-related transactions with Hudson.  The government presented 
telephone records, wiretap recordings, and testimony from surveilling officers.  The jury 
                                              
1
 Hudson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute between fifteen and fifty kilograms of 
cocaine.   
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 “To establish a conspiracy, the evidence must show that the alleged conspirators 
shared a unity of purpose, an intent to achieve a common goal, and had an agreement to 
work together to achieve that goal.”  United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 829 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  “The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from evidence of related facts 
and circumstances from which it appears, as a reasonable and logical inference, that the 
activities of the participants in the criminal venture could not have been carried on except 
as the result of a preconceived scheme or common understanding.”  United States v. 
Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1966).  It is not necessary for the government to prove 
that each defendant knew all the other participants or details of the conspiracy.  United 
States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds 
by United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996). 
We may affirm a jury finding that separate drug sales constituted a single 
conspiracy if there is “sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that 
each drug transaction was a step in achieving the conspiracy‟s common goal of 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of jury convictions on the 
basis of insufficiency of the evidence “places a very heavy burden on the appellant.”  
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995).  We must affirm a conviction 
as long as “there is substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands 
v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1995).  We may not “re-weigh the evidence 
presented at trial or reassess the credibility of the witnesses . . . .”  United States v. Al 
Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 605 (3d Cir. 2004).  We have plenary review over whether 
counts were improperly joined.  United States v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40, 41 (3d Cir. 1987).  
We review the denial of a motion for severance for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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distributing cocaine for profit.”  Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 593.  But “a simple buyer-
seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales 
agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer was a member of the seller‟s 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).   
A 
 Both defendants contend the evidence was insufficient to sustain their conspiracy 
convictions.  Nichols insists the government‟s evidence only proves that he and Hudson 
had a buyer-seller relationship.  Williams similarly argues that he and Hudson merely 
performed a few isolated “favors” for one another with no further understanding or 
agreement.  We conclude there was substantial evidence that both Williams and Nichols 
conspired with Hudson to help each other in their respective drug trafficking businesses, 
with the ultimate goal of distributing cocaine for profit.   
 To determine whether a defendant has joined a conspiracy,
3
 we have looked to 
many factors, including “the length of affiliation between the defendant and the 
conspiracy; whether there is an established method of payment; the extent to which 
transactions are standardized; and whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust.”  
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.  The use of pseudonyms and coded language can point to a 
defendant‟s participation in a conspiracy.  See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 
323-25 (3d Cir. 1992). 
The evidence demonstrated a clear pattern of mutual assistance and trust between 
                                              
3
 Here, like in Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 195, there is ample evidence a narcotics conspiracy 
existed—the central inquiry is whether defendants joined it.  
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Hudson and defendants.  For instance, Hudson testified that although he and his cousin 
Nichols maintained separate businesses, he helped Nichols on several occasions, meaning 
that “[i]f he called me and needed some help, I would sometimes give him money, or if 
he—if he wanted some drugs, I would give him drugs.”  Suppl. App. Appellee vol. 1, 
128:1-3.  And Nichols, in turn, helped Hudson by finding a supplier that sold Hudson a 
kilogram of cocaine.    
Hudson testified he had a similar relationship with his old friend Lamont 
Williams, who sometimes did “favors” for him.4  If Hudson‟s regular suppliers were 
unable to provide the amount of cocaine he needed, Hudson would ask Williams whether 
he had cocaine or knew some other source.  Williams performed at least two “favors” for 
Hudson in 2007 and 2008, supplying him with a kilogram of cocaine on one occasion and 
two kilograms on another occasion.  And Hudson helped Williams by selling nine ounces 
of cocaine to him when he needed it.  
There was also evidence that Hudson and defendants kept in close contact, 
checked up on one another after leaving drug transactions, used nicknames, and spoke in 
code to avoid detection by police.  This evidence undermines defendants‟ assertions that 
their relationships with Hudson consisted of a few discrete buyer-seller transactions or 
isolated favors.  Instead, it suggests Hudson and defendants had a mutual, ongoing 
                                              
4
 Hudson describes these transactions as “favors” because he and Williams would not 
make a profit from one another.  But there is no requirement that a conspiracy prove 
profitable to its conspirators.  Furthermore, even though Hudson and Williams did not 
make a profit in transactions with one another, the transactions were nonetheless 
mutually advantageous because they allowed Hudson and Williams to continue to 




understanding they would help one another when needed.  Based on this evidence, a 
rational jury could find the relationship between Hudson and defendants was, at bottom, a 
“tacit agreement” to distribute cocaine for profit.5  See United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 
73, 80 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting conspiracies “are ordinarily formed by tacit agreement”).   
B 
Nichols and Williams both contend the evidence does not support the jury‟s 
findings they conspired to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.  Nichols 
presumably bases this argument on Hudson‟s testimony that “between three and four 
kilos” passed between him and Nichols during his drug-distribution operation.  App. vol. 
1, 268:19; but see id. at 269:8 (calling this a “rough estimate”).  Similarly, Williams 
argues the government‟s evidence of “favors” between Hudson and Williams only totaled 
three kilograms of cocaine.   
Because Nichols and Williams were convicted of conspiracy—the agreement to 
distribute cocaine—the jury was not bound to only consider the cocaine that actually 
passed between defendants and Hudson.  Cf. United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 
270, 274-75 (2003) (explaining that conspiracy is “„a distinct evil,‟ which „may exist and 
be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.‟” (quoting Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997))).  Furthermore, the twenty-year mandatory statutory 
                                              
5
 Additionally, we have found “sufficient evidence of a conspiracy” where a witness 
testified the defendant gave him drugs on credit, with payment to be made after the drugs 
were sold.  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008).  Hudson testified 
that he loaned money to Nichols to purchase drugs for both of them and that Williams 
gave cocaine to Hudson on credit, collecting payment after Hudson sold it. Under 
Iglesias, this testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to demonstrate defendants conspired 





 is triggered by the amount of cocaine distributed by the conspiracy as a whole 
and not the amount of cocaine attributable to defendants personally.  See United States v. 
Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining “when it comes to the statutory 
penalties, every coconspirator is liable for the . . . transactions that were reasonably 
foreseeable acts in furtherance of the entire conspiracy”).  
There was ample evidence to support the jury‟s findings that each defendant 
conspired with Hudson to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.  Hudson testified 
at the height of his drug trafficking operation, he was distributing between two and three 
kilograms of cocaine per month.  He pled guilty to distributing between fifteen and fifty 
kilograms of cocaine.  Circumstantial evidence suggested Nichols and Williams were 
aware of the scope of Hudson‟s operation—Hudson kept in close touch with defendants, 
purchased distribution-size quantities of cocaine from defendants, and did so only when 
his regular suppliers fell through.  Nichols also sought to borrow substantial sums of 
money from Hudson.  Accordingly, the jury could have rationally concluded defendants 
agreed to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine because they knew the scope of 
Hudson‟s operation and formed ongoing, open-ended agreements to help him.  
Since the government‟s charges were supported by substantial evidence and a jury 
could have rationally concluded defendants conspired to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine, the District Court properly imposed a mandatory twenty-year sentence 
                                              
6
 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant convicted of distribution or possession 
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine shall be sentenced to a 
minimum of 10 years of imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment.  This 
mandatory statutory minimum doubled to twenty years for both Nichols and Williams 
because of prior drug-related felony convictions.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
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for both defendants.   See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 
110, 113 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the statutory minimum drug trafficking penalty as 
mandatory), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2947 (2011).  
III 
Williams contends the District Court improperly joined the felon-in-possession 
count with the conspiracy count.  Williams also asserts he was unfairly prejudiced by the 
failure to sever the two offenses.   
Under Rule 8(a), offenses may be joined if they “are of the same or similar 
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute 
parts of a common scheme or plan.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).  The counts here are 
“sufficiently connected temporally or logically” to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a).  
United States v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1987).  Like in Gorecki, “it is 
reasonable to assume that the firearm could have been used as a vital part of a plan to 
possess and distribute drugs, particularly since the firearm and the narcotics-related 
evidence were found on the same premises, at the same time, as a result of the same legal 
search.”7  Id.  
Williams has also failed to show joinder created a substantial risk of prejudice.  In 
United States v. Joshua, we approved the same bifurcated trial procedure followed here, 
explaining that it ensures a “defendant‟s criminal past is not made known to the jury until 
after they have reached a verdict with respect to the other charges.  At the same time, this 
                                              
7
 The firearm in Williams‟ apartment was discovered along with $7,620 in cash, five cell 
phones, and a driver‟s license under Williams‟ pseudonym.   
10 
 
procedure is considerably more efficient than conducting an entire new jury trial on the 
weapon possession charge at a later date.”  976 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir. 1992), abrogated 
on other grounds by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).  We rejected 
defendant‟s contention that he was prejudiced by the procedure, finding “[t]he potential 
for the type of prejudice . . . of which Joshua complains is the same potential for 
prejudice that every criminal defendant faces when multiple counts are tried together.”  
Id.   
Like Joshua, Williams cannot show he was prejudiced by the joinder.  Rather, as 
the District Court pointed out, evidence of the gun possession was relevant to the 
conspiracy charge, see United States v. Picklesimer, 585 F.2d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(“[W]e believe that where a defendant is charged with narcotics conspiracy, evidence that 
weapons were found in his possession may be relevant and admissible. . . . [A] weapon 
may be as much a tool of the crime as the van used to transport the narcotics.”), and 
evidence of the conspiracy was relevant to the gun possession charge, see Gorecki, 813 
F.2d at 42 (positing that a narcotics charge could be relevant as evidence of “motive, 
preparation, or plan” at a trial for a weapon charge).  In particular, since Williams leased 
his apartment under a pseudonym, evidence of the conspiracy was necessary to link 
Williams to the apartment in which the gun was found.  Evidence of both offenses would 
have been admissible at separate trials. Williams was not substantially prejudiced by 
having the two counts tried together.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Williams‟ motion to sever the charge of felon in possession of a 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of conviction and 
sentence of Vaughn Nichols and Lamont Williams. 
